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Did Britain enter World War 2 too soon?


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I've just finished reading a book by Patrick Buchanan, the former Republican politician who tried to get on the US Presidential ticket in 1992. Entitled "Churchill, Hitler and the Unnecessary War", the book argues that Britain should never have gotten involved in either war, and of the Second World War in particular, Britain's rush to action in 1939 not only failed in its original mandate - the protection of Polish independence, but also cost her the Empire.

 

Buchanan is scathing of Britain and France's decision to offer Poland a war guarantee. As history proved in short order, neither country was ready or able to protect Poland. Worse than empty threat, it pushed Germany into the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, giving them a free hand to prosecute a war on one front. Prior to that, Hitler's ambitions reportedly lay east, the direction he eventually took in 1941 when western frontiers were secured and German forces initiated Operation Barbarossa.

 

Before the war guarantee was issued, Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia were primed for conflict. Opposing ideologies, plus the small matter of Hitler wanting "lebensraum" in the east made war between them an inevitability. Both regimes were abhorrent by the contemporary democratic standards of the day. Was there a case for letting them kick the sh*t out of each other?

 

I don't agree with all of Buchanan's arguments or conclusions, but I do wonder whether Britain and France were wise to:-

 

1) dole out the war guarantee to Poland

2 ) actually make good on it.

 

I'm not saying we should have never gone to war, but the US did very well out of the Second World War by staying out for as long as possible. They benefited financially from the war economy and were able to make huge demands on entering the war, largely on account of being the senior partner in lend lease arrangements. Post-war, empires were dismantled, rivals were diminished and the US emerged from the conflict as creditor, liberator and one of two superpowers in what used to be a multi-polar world.

 

Did Britain enter the war too soon?

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No, Britain acted too late as the League of Nations was pretty much useless. They should have acted as soon as Germany marched into the Rheinland.

 

That's a strong point, and coincidentally enough, one of Buchanan's key turning points in the road to war. I believe that only a few German divisions were sent in to the Rhineland with strict instructions to turn tail if they faced any resistance. Hitler knew he was weak at that point; it was the ideal time to show resolve.

 

One of the big reasons we didn't act was guilt over the Versailles treaty. Many western politicians recognised it for what it was, a treaty signed under duress that happened to coincide with the end of a post-armistice starvation blockade on Germany. There was tacit recognition that the Versailles was harsh on Germany, and not much appetite for contesting minor border changes to restore the German-speaking lands excised from Germany in 1919.

 

The military occupation of the Rhineland isn't quite the same, but falls into the same "restoration of something Germany had before" category that I've just created for the purposes of my argument. You are correct though - much could have been changed at that specific point in history. The French were too busy arguing amongst themselves and the opportunity was lost.

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I find this a interesting hypothesis.

 

It's perfectly true that Britain and France did declare war on Germany before they declared war on us, indeed Hitler probably miscalculated our reaction disastrously. Hitler was the ultimate opportunist remember and there was never a true Nazi 'Masterplan' for world domination. So in that sense we could perhaps have avoided war in 1939 had we abandoned poor Poland to its terrible fate. That of course ignores both the political realities of the situation and even the question of the personal honour and reputation of the statesmen involved. There is always a Human Factor at play it this type of situation. In truth methinks war was a near inevitable 'chain reaction' as soon as the first Panzer trundled across the Polish border.

 

But for arguments sake, say Britain and France did allow Hitler (and Stalin) to carve up Poland unopposed, what does Germany then do next?

 

It seems to me that Nazi Germany is in much the same (dangerous) strategic situation as the Kaiser's Germany was back in 1914, IE it finds itself still trapped between two potentially hostile power blocs - the Soviet Union/Russia to their east and the allied forces of France and the British Empire to the west. So unless Hitler suddenly becomes converted to the many advantages of peaceful coexistence with his neighbours (a possibility methinks we can safely discard) then he still has to remove at least one of these rival power blocs to ensure the survival of his 'Thousand Year' Reich. But which one?

 

It's all so hypothetical we can never know for sure what happens next, for instance the Generals might have ousted him or he could still have invaded the west as happened in reality. But I suspect that not being in a state war with Britain and France at the time tempts the Fuhrer irresistibly to invade the Soviet Union during the spring/early summer of 1940, not withstanding the (deeply cynical) Ribbentrop/Molotov 'non-aggression' pact he had agreed with the Soviets. Indeed that goal was surely always his ultimate ambition. If that 1940 version of Operation Barbarossa were to have occurred we can perhaps further speculate that he may have succeeded in destroying the Soviet Union that summer given the chronic (and self inflicted) unpreparedness of the Red Army.

 

Hay, I see I've built a veritable mountain of speculation here already, but it seems to me just as likely that, far from being advantageous, it may be that our failing to declare war on Nazi Germany in September 1939 could have proved to be a cataclysmic disaster for all Humanity.

Edited by CHAPEL END CHARLIE
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I've just finished reading a book by Patrick Buchanan, the former Republican politician who tried to get on the US Presidential ticket in 1992. Entitled "Churchill, Hitler and the Unnecessary War", the book argues that Britain should never have gotten involved in either war, and of the Second World War in particular, Britain's rush to action in 1939 not only failed in its original mandate - the protection of Polish independence, but also cost her the Empire.

 

Buchanan is scathing of Britain and France's decision to offer Poland a war guarantee. As history proved in short order, neither country was ready or able to protect Poland. Worse than empty threat, it pushed Germany into the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, giving them a free hand to prosecute a war on one front. Prior to that, Hitler's ambitions reportedly lay east, the direction he eventually took in 1941 when western frontiers were secured and German forces initiated Operation Barbarossa.

 

Before the war guarantee was issued, Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia were primed for conflict. Opposing ideologies, plus the small matter of Hitler wanting "lebensraum" in the east made war between them an inevitability. Both regimes were abhorrent by the contemporary democratic standards of the day. Was there a case for letting them kick the sh*t out of each other?

 

I don't agree with all of Buchanan's arguments or conclusions, but I do wonder whether Britain and France were wise to:-

 

1) dole out the war guarantee to Poland

2 ) actually make good on it.

 

I'm not saying we should have never gone to war, but the US did very well out of the Second World War by staying out for as long as possible. They benefited financially from the war economy and were able to make huge demands on entering the war, largely on account of being the senior partner in lend lease arrangements. Post-war, empires were dismantled, rivals were diminished and the US emerged from the conflict as creditor, liberator and one of two superpowers in what used to be a multi-polar world.

 

Did Britain enter the war too soon?

 

No Germany went to war too soon in my opinion. If we had taken them on two years later they would have been significantly stronger. We should have gone to war earlier - appeasement failed us.

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The Yanks stayed out of the war until it looked like their big business interests were likely to lose their money we owed them. They basically bled us dry and then came in late. So it is pretty lame an American talking to us about it.

You have to go back and sit how the people felt at the time, we were still licking our wounds after the First World War and the nation were happy to appease in the hope that Hitler was not as some worried he was. Had the British and French been move aggressive then Hitler would have been reined in. Sadly we appeased and the rest is history. We did not go in too early, as Hitler would have got stronger earlier and history could have been so different

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The Yanks stayed out of the war until it looked like their big business interests were likely to lose their money we owed them. They basically bled us dry and then came in late. So it is pretty lame an American talking to us about it.

You have to go back and sit how the people felt at the time, we were still licking our wounds after the First World War and the nation were happy to appease in the hope that Hitler was not as some worried he was. Had the British and French been move aggressive then Hitler would have been reined in. Sadly we appeased and the rest is history. We did not go in too early, as Hitler would have got stronger earlier and history could have been so different

 

Umm,

 

I was under the impression that the USA entered the war only after its fleet was attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbour and Japan's Axis partner, Nazi Germany, first declared war on them. So therefore it would seem that the timing of foreign aggression directed against her, rather than villainous US 'Big Business' interests, was the true cause of America entering into the war 'late' as you put it.

 

As for staying out of the war and 'bleeding Britain dry', the record shows that even prior to the 7th of December 1941 the US was not only heavily involved in providing 'Lend Leese' equipment to this country, but it was also by then playing a bit part in escorting the vital North Atlantic convoys - at some cost in American life. It's perfectly true of course that prior to President Roosevelt's (politically courageous) decision to push the Lend-Lease Bill through a reluctant Congress we did indeed have to pay for military equipment ordered from US manufacturers - but I must admit however that I'm struggling to see what is wrong, or indeed unusual, with that situation frankly.

 

I say those who really value the ideals of democracy and freedom should be profoundly grateful for the key role the USA played in defeating fascism during WWII, rather than casting false aspersions as to their true motivation for doing so.

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Umm,

 

I was under the impression that the USA entered the war only after its fleet was attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbour and Japan's Axis partner, Nazi Germany, first declared war on them. So therefore it would seem that the timing of foreign aggression directed against her, rather than villainous US 'Big Business' interests, was the true cause of America entering into the war 'late' as you put it.

 

As for staying out of the war and 'bleeding Britain dry', the record shows that even prior to the 7th of December 1941 the US was not only heavily involved in providing 'Lend Leese' equipment to this country, but it was also by then playing a bit part in escorting the vital North Atlantic convoys - at some cost in American life. It's perfectly true of course that prior to President Roosevelt's (politically courageous) decision to push the Lend-Lease Bill through a reluctant Congress we did indeed have to pay for military equipment ordered from US manufacturers - but I must admit however that I'm struggling to see what is wrong, or indeed unusual, with that situation frankly.

 

I say those who really value the ideals of democracy and freedom should be profoundly grateful for the key role the USA played in defeating fascism during WWII, rather than casting false aspersions as to their true motivation for doing so.

I concede, you are correct

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I find this a interesting hypothesis.

 

It's perfectly true that Britain and France did declare war on Germany before they declared war on us, indeed Hitler probably miscalculated our reaction disastrously. Hitler was the ultimate opportunist remember and there was never a true Nazi 'Masterplan' for world domination. So in that sense we could perhaps have avoided war in 1939 had we abandoned poor Poland to its terrible fate. That of course ignores both the political realities of the situation and even the question of the personal honour and reputation of the statesmen involved. There is always a Human Factor at play it this type of situation. In truth methinks war was a near inevitable 'chain reaction' as soon as the first Panzer trundled across the Polish border.

 

But for arguments sake, say Britain and France did allow Hitler (and Stalin) to carve up Poland unopposed, what does Germany then do next?

 

It seems to me that Nazi Germany is in much the same (dangerous) strategic situation as the Kaiser's Germany was back in 1914, IE it finds itself still trapped between two potentially hostile power blocs - the Soviet Union/Russia to their east and the allied forces of France and the British Empire to the west. So unless Hitler suddenly becomes converted to the many advantages of peaceful coexistence with his neighbours (a possibility methinks we can safely discard) then he still has to remove at least one of these rival power blocs to ensure the survival of his 'Thousand Year' Reich. But which one?

 

It's all so hypothetical we can never know for sure what happens next, for instance the Generals might have ousted him or he could still have invaded the west as happened in reality. But I suspect that not being in a state war with Britain and France at the time tempts the Fuhrer irresistibly to invade the Soviet Union during the spring/early summer of 1940, not withstanding the (deeply cynical) Ribbentrop/Molotov 'non-aggression' pact he had agreed with the Soviets. Indeed that goal was surely always his ultimate ambition. If that 1940 version of Operation Barbarossa were to have occurred we can perhaps further speculate that he may have succeeded in destroying the Soviet Union that summer given the chronic (and self inflicted) unpreparedness of the Red Army.

 

Hay, I see I've built a veritable mountain of speculation here already, but it seems to me just as likely that, far from being advantageous, it may be that our failing to declare war on Nazi Germany in September 1939 could have proved to be a cataclysmic disaster for all Humanity.

 

Hitler was using the obvious logic of the situation. Britain and France were in no position to wage war in Poland, as the months of the Phoney War demonstrated. He was genuinely surprised that they followed through with their war guarantee. You are correct though. It was a big miscalculation on Hitler's part and personal sentiment played a huge part, particularly public opinion. Opinions toward Germany went through a sea-change when the Nazis rolled into parts of Czechoslovakia that weren't ethnically German.

 

You're also right in identifying Hitler as an opportunist. The reoccupation of the Rhineland was a huge gamble, as was the Anschluss. Would Hitler's ambitions have turned west had he won a 1940 Barbarossa in 1940? There's certainly some evidence to suggest that he would. France were one of the biggest champions of the then-discredited Versailles treaty. France's 1940 surrender was signed in the same train carriage as the 1918 armistice that brought such calamity to Germany. It strongly suggests unfinished business with the French. I think you have a case.

 

That said, I do wonder whether a couple of years of rearmament and preparation would have played against Hitler's opportunism. Would a heavily-armed and well-drilled France have given him pause when glancing westward? You've also got to figure that any hypothetical Nazi victory over the Soviet Union would have involved an organised resistance, partisans and potentially years of consolidation, German settlement and forces diverted to cover the new frontiers.

 

There was no guarantee that Hitler would have won a 1940 war with Russia. The Soviets weren't prepared in 1941 either; it cost them a lot of territory and lives. I don't think Soviet preparedness was a big factor in the overall outcome of the war. The Soviets won because they were able to simultaneously absorb their invaders and reinforce themselves. They produced more tanks and artillery than anyone else in the war. The Red Army fielded 34 million men during the conflict. A 1940 invasion might have allowed the Germans to get further than they managed in 1941, but the Germans would have run into the same supply problems that eventually sank them in the winters of '41 and '42.

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The book, Hitler’s Table Talk, is a collection of Hitler’s views gathered by his private secretary, Martin Borman, and others, from conversations and monologues Hilter gave to his inner-circle.

 

It’s some years since I read it, but if my memory serves me correctly, Hilter’s world view, prior to WWII, was for Germany to control an expanded mainland Europe and Britain to maintain its oversees’ empire. These 2 great super-powers would then keep America in check, whilst all would unite to annihilate communism. I can’t recall whether or not Hilter expected Britain to actively co-operate with plans for his other ‘sub-human undesirables’.

 

It’s interesting to speculate on a post-1940 world without, for example, the Soviet Bloc countries and Israel.

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But I suspect that not being in a state war with Britain and France at the time tempts the Fuhrer irresistibly to invade the Soviet Union during the spring/early summer of 1940, not withstanding the (deeply cynical) Ribbentrop/Molotov 'non-aggression' pact he had agreed with the Soviets. Indeed that goal was surely always his ultimate ambition. If that 1940 version of Operation Barbarossa were to have occurred we can perhaps further speculate that he may have succeeded in destroying the Soviet Union that summer given the chronic (and self inflicted) unpreparedness of the Red Army.

 

 

I suspect that the German plan was always to invade Russia in 1941; the Heer ( Army ) was not happy with commencing hostilities in 1939 because they weren't ready. The German armour, in terms of numbers, as well as quality of armament and protection ( apart from the Czech tanks they adopted after 1938 ) was inferior to what the French and Russians had, and despite the mythos of the BlitzKrieg, most of the divisional artillery was horse drawn, and the vast bulk of the infantry went on foot.

What the western allies should have done was to commence an attack against German territory as soon as they could after war was declared, but the mentality of the French was strictly defensive, ( although they did make a token advance of about 7 miles on part of the frontier ), and they sat, cosy, in the 'impregnable' Maginot Line. which the Germans, of course, simply drove around.

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Hitler was using the obvious logic of the situation. Britain and France were in no position to wage war in Poland, as the months of the Phoney War demonstrated. He was genuinely surprised that they followed through with their war guarantee. You are correct though. It was a big miscalculation on Hitler's part and personal sentiment played a huge part, particularly public opinion. Opinions toward Germany went through a sea-change when the Nazis rolled into parts of Czechoslovakia that weren't ethnically German.

 

You're also right in identifying Hitler as an opportunist. The reoccupation of the Rhineland was a huge gamble, as was the Anschluss. Would Hitler's ambitions have turned west had he won a 1940 Barbarossa in 1940? There's certainly some evidence to suggest that he would. France were one of the biggest champions of the then-discredited Versailles treaty. France's 1940 surrender was signed in the same train carriage as the 1918 armistice that brought such calamity to Germany. It strongly suggests unfinished business with the French. I think you have a case.

 

That said, I do wonder whether a couple of years of rearmament and preparation would have played against Hitler's opportunism. Would a heavily-armed and well-drilled France have given him pause when glancing westward? You've also got to figure that any hypothetical Nazi victory over the Soviet Union would have involved an organised resistance, partisans and potentially years of consolidation, German settlement and forces diverted to cover the new frontiers.

 

There was no guarantee that Hitler would have won a 1940 war with Russia. The Soviets weren't prepared in 1941 either; it cost them a lot of territory and lives. I don't think Soviet preparedness was a big factor in the overall outcome of the war. The Soviets won because they were able to simultaneously absorb their invaders and reinforce themselves. They produced more tanks and artillery than anyone else in the war. The Red Army fielded 34 million men during the conflict. A 1940 invasion might have allowed the Germans to get further than they managed in 1941, but the Germans would have run into the same supply problems that eventually sank them in the winters of '41 and '42.

 

Yes, a perfectly reasonable and fair analysis of the situation - the emphasis you place on the critical role the Soviet people played in defeating Nazi Germany is often overlooked in the west, but undeniably true nevertheless.

 

All I will add however is that the actual Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union launched in July 1941 (critically some weeks late because of operations in the Balkans) did come pretty darn close to reaching Moscow, indeed there is a old (possibly apocryphal) tale that a forward reconnaissance unit of Von Runstedt's Army Group Centre got so close they could actually see the towers of the Kremlin glittering in the distance. In addition, historically Siberian divisions withdrawn for the Soviet Manchurian front with Imperial Japan played a significant role in defending the approaches to Moscow in the winter of 1941, and as the Soviet-Japanese Non Aggression Pact was not signed until April 1941 these forces may not have been available in front of Moscow 12 months earlier.

 

So a arguable case can be made that the Germans would not have had to do all that much better in 1940 than they did a year later to enter the Soviet capital and topple Stalin perhaps.

We can never know of course whether even that would have initiated a final collapse of the Soviet resistance, or whether the war would have gone on anyway. We do know for sure however that there was a time during 1941 when Stalin himself feared he was about to be ousted.

 

Ultimately it's all speculation of course ... but as you can probably guess I kinda like that sort of thing.

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Yes, a perfectly reasonable and fair analysis of the situation - the emphasis you place on the critical role the Soviet people played in defeating Nazi Germany is often overlooked in the west, but undeniably true nevertheless.

 

All I will add however is that the actual Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union launched in July 1941 (critically some weeks late because of operations in the Balkans) did come pretty darn close to reaching Moscow, indeed there is a old (possibly apocryphal) tale that a forward reconnaissance unit of Von Runstedt's Army Group Centre got so close they could actually see the towers of the Kremlin glittering in the distance. In addition, historically Siberian divisions withdrawn for the Soviet Manchurian front with Imperial Japan played a significant role in defending the approaches to Moscow in the winter of 1941, and as the Soviet-Japanese Non Aggression Pact was not signed until April 1941 these forces may not have been available in front of Moscow 12 months earlier.

 

So a arguable case can be made that the Germans would not have had to do all that much better in 1940 than they did a year later to enter the Soviet capital and topple Stalin perhaps.

We can never know of course whether even that would have initiated a final collapse of the Soviet resistance, or whether the war would have gone on anyway. We do know for sure however that there was a time during 1941 when Stalin himself feared he was about to be ousted.

 

Ultimately it's all speculation of course ... but as you can probably guess I kinda like that sort of thing.

 

It's not a tale.

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In the hypothetical scenario whereby Britain and France don’t declare war on Germany following their invasion of Poland, thus encouraging Germany to invade Russia a year earlier than they actually did, then, for the reasons already stated by CEC, my best guess would be that this invasion would have been successful. It would almost certainly have not been opposed by any of the other western powers because for most people, especially the governing powers of that era, Communism was seen as a greater threat than Nazism.

 

Of course, Pap is right to say that the vast country of Russia with its huge population would never be entirely subjugated; yet this was, I think, something that Hilter not only envisaged, but also welcomed. In his world-view he imagined an area of perpetual military strife, far away from Germany, where young Germans could be honed in the art of warfare – a rights of passage sort of thing. He also saw plenty of opportunities in such an area for ‘undesirables’ displaced from an ever-expanding greater Germany.

 

Much of what happens next would likely depend on which country won the race to build the atomic bomb.

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indeed there is a old (possibly apocryphal) tale that a forward reconnaissance unit of Von Runstedt's Army Group Centre got so close they could actually see the towers of the Kremlin glittering in the distance. ....

 

The nearest point to the centre of Moscow that the Germans reached was to the NorthWest, at Khimki. There is a memorial to mark the spot at just over 20Km from the Kremlin.

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I suspect that the German plan was always to invade Russia in 1941; the Heer ( Army ) was not happy with commencing hostilities in 1939 because they weren't ready. The German armour, in terms of numbers, as well as quality of armament and protection ( apart from the Czech tanks they adopted after 1938 ) was inferior to what the French and Russians had, and despite the mythos of the BlitzKrieg, most of the divisional artillery was horse drawn, and the vast bulk of the infantry went on foot.

What the western allies should have done was to commence an attack against German territory as soon as they could after war was declared, but the mentality of the French was strictly defensive, ( although they did make a token advance of about 7 miles on part of the frontier ), and they sat, cosy, in the 'impregnable' Maginot Line. which the Germans, of course, simply drove around.

 

Again, more reasonable and informed points. This forum could do with more posts of this caliber.

 

I'd say the west going to Poland's aid in 1939 (in a truly serious and effective manner that is) would have imposed a much more heavy burden on France that it would have on a primarily maritime power like Britain. The reasons are (as I suspect you may already know) that only their Army was of a sufficient size to possibly undertake such a bold military adventure. But mere size isn't everything.

 

None of the participants in WWII were in my opinion truly prepared for war in 1939, not even Nazi Germany. The poor old 'III République' however was a utter 'basket case' when it comes to its preparedness to launch a significant offensive war against western Germany in 1939/40, or even to defend itself adaquatly for that matter.

I'm not just referring here to their defensive 'Maginot Line' mentality, lack of efficient industrial organisation and modern military equipment - although France was particularly weak in those respects - but more so to the chronic political instability evident among both their governing class and general population. France in 1939/40: a nation you could almost say that was defeated from within long before the Germans invaded.

 

I think that's why Hitler took the huge risk of invading Poland and leaving his western frontier weakly defended, a gamble taken against the advice of his General Staff, he instinctively guessed (or knew somehow) that France lacked both the will and the ability to stop him.

 

Leaving aside the detailed nitty gritty of history, the wider point about our delaying declaring war on German in order to gain time to prepare better leaves me unconvinced because we (or Britain anyway) was already doing nearly everything a democracy possible could to rearm ever since 1937/8 anyway. Examine the record closely and you will see that every British Shipyard, Aircraft Factory and Armament Works was working flat out ever since the Munich Crisis, if not before. We may have started late, but the decision to go to war in September 1939 changes surprisingly little in that respect.

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......The poor old 'III République' however was a utter 'basket case' when it comes to its preparedness to launch a significant offensive war against western Germany in 1939/40, or even to defend itself adaquatly for that matter. I'm not just referring here to their defensive 'Maginot Line' mentality, lack of efficient industrial organisation and modern military equipment - although France was particularly weak in those respects - but more so to the chronic political instability evident among both their governing class and general population. France in 1939/40: a nation you could almost say that was defeated from within long before the Germans invaded.

 

I agree about the French mentality, one division at Sedan during the Ardennes offensive in 1940 abandoned it's position in panic when the men heard tanks approaching - the tanks were their own reinforcements. The success of the BlitzKreig was based on the divisional generals in the German army, such as Rommel and Guderian, taking some extreme chances ( often in direct contravention of Army orders ), and in doing so beating their opposition psychologically by spreading fear and panic in the rear of opposing formations whilst avoiding direct head to head conbat.

Edited by badgerx16
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The nearest point to the centre of Moscow that the Germans reached was to the NorthWest, at Khimki. There is a memorial to mark the spot at just over 20Km from the Kremlin.

 

That's where the offensive was halted but there is evidence, both Russian and German, that recon units got even closer than that, including up to the banks of the Moscow river.

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if the Nazis had got 'the Bomb' and started to threatened our position in the Middle East......Would the Nazis still have invaded Denmark and Norway?

 

Didnt they need Norwegian 'heavy water' in order to produce a bomb - ir at least speed its development.

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Would the Nazis still have invaded Denmark and Norway?

 

Norway was invaded primarily for 2 reasons - to gain better access to Swedish iron ore, and to take control of harbours granting more open access to the North Atlantic and British supply routes. Denmark was just in the way. However there was the secondary justification of expanding the 'germanic empire', so possibly this would still have happened.

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Chamberlain gets a lot of unfair stick. Britain was totally unprepared for war in 1938. He bought us a year and organised massive re-armanent.

 

Did Chamberlain organise it or did Churchill, I thought he spent that year dining out on peace in our time dinners and undermining Churchill and Hore-Belisha?

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I say those who really value the ideals of democracy and freedom should be profoundly grateful for the key role the USA played in defeating fascism during WWII, rather than casting false aspersions as to their true motivation for doing so.

One of the the USA objectives was to dismantle the British Empire and they've done an excellent job in preserving Democracy and Freedom since haven't they ?

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One of the the USA objectives was to dismantle the British Empire and they've done an excellent job in preserving Democracy and Freedom since haven't they ?

 

all this makes interesting reading..

 

I have understood that one major reason for the good ol US eventually get involved in WWII was an attempt by ze germans to get mexico to attack USA from the south to regain Texas and other states the US had 'taken'. Germany encouraged them and were going to assist with full naval support.

The mexicans werent too interested (bit of a shame) and their embassy spilled the news to the US whom were not too happy and realised these nazis could even be a threat for them.

So the US involvemnet was purely on self protection. Not really the Hollywood script.

 

On the scandinavian debate...were the swedes neutral ? Not a chance. Supported the nazis from the start. Allowed military transport across their country (to ease troup movemnets to and from Norway). Made a fortune from the selling of Iron-ore to the war machine.

They were smart enough to switch and assist the allies when it all started to turn pear-shaped for the man with the moustache.

And came out of WWII with a booming economy.

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One of the the USA objectives was to dismantle the British Empire and they've done an excellent job in preserving Democracy and Freedom since haven't they ?

 

I think I'd be as cynical as yourself when considering US motives for getting involved. In short, their people really didn't want to get involved. Roosevelt and other administration figures did. Interwar Americans felt like they'd been tricked and jipped over the First World War - that American blood was used to secure colonial gains. The post-war settlement left Britain with the biggest incarnation of its empire ever. The Yanks got nowt, territorrially speaking. There was also the matter of unpaid war debt from the Great War. Western European powers borrowed from the US, and didn't pay it back.

 

When Churchill and Roosevelt met before Pearl Harbor in 1941, Winston remarked upon Roosevelt's "astonishing depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war". Roosevelt knew that "the American people would never agree to enter the war in Europe unless they were attacked within their own borders". The intent to go to war already existed. Pearl Harbor merely provided Roosevelt with the casus belli he needed for the American public.

 

If Churchill is to be believed (and Roosevelt was being sincere when they met), FDR had designs on dragging America into the war anyway. Now as Charlie says, this desire may have stemmed from a love of democracy and the distant horror of it falling away in Europe. FDR certainly made enough speeches about the principles of democracy at this time. I tend to be a little more cynical, particularly when it comes to statesmen. I think it likely that from the outset, the US had specific aims about what it wanted to achieve in the war - which took the desperate plight of European nations into account.

 

Lend-lease gave them tremendous power when negotiating with their Western European counterparts, and it's no surprise that the US ended the war as one of the two genuine winners, the other being the Soviet Union. The Soviets lost around 10 million military personnel. The US total military losses amount to less than half a million. While it's reductive to talk about pure numbers, it does demonstrate how well the US did out of the war. The conflict never came to the continental US, and for half a million lives, the country made unprecedented gains in soft and hard power.

 

While I'm very grateful for US assistance in both conflicts, they didn't get involved purely on principle.

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Apart from the 'second happy time' U-Boat blitz on coastal shipping - over 600 ships sunk.

 

In the early part of the war the US lacked the right ships and skills to protect convoys off their eastern shore - so some armed British naval reserve, mainly converted merchantmen were sent to help them (and us out). There is a tiny beautiful British Cemetery containing the only four bodies recovered from HMS Bedfordshire in Ocracoke in the outer banks of North Carolina. Its also the place where the navy killed Blackbeard the pirate. The outer banks, especially the southern end are well worth a visit.

 

british-cemetery.jpg

 

ocracoke-british-cemetery-7904.jpg

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I suspect that the German plan was always to invade Russia in 1941; the Heer ( Army ) was not happy with commencing hostilities in 1939 because they weren't ready. The German armour, in terms of numbers, as well as quality of armament and protection ( apart from the Czech tanks they adopted after 1938 ) was inferior to what the French and Russians had, and despite the mythos of the BlitzKrieg, most of the divisional artillery was horse drawn, and the vast bulk of the infantry went on foot.

What the western allies should have done was to commence an attack against German territory as soon as they could after war was declared, but the mentality of the French was strictly defensive, ( although they did make a token advance of about 7 miles on part of the frontier ), and they sat, cosy, in the 'impregnable' Maginot Line. which the Germans, of course, simply drove around.

 

I'm not so sure it was definitley always going to be in 1941. To me it seems more like they were pushed to make a decision due to the circumstances they found themselves in. Firstly, Britain refused to do the logical thing and surrender which really scuppered Hitler’s plans. Secondly, the German war machine was desperately short of oil. They had two main options in try to solve this. Take the North African oil fields in Libya etc. i.e. focus their attention on Britain or attempt to take control of the huge oil reserves in the Soviet union.

In terms of his ideals, it was probably not a tough choice for Hitler. We didn't offer him the living space he required and it is widely believed that he admired and respected us as a nation whereas he despised the Soviet union. There is also the fact that Stalin was carrying out large scale military reforms which would of come into place by 1942 which would have greatly strengthened their army. Hubert Menzel who was a major at the German army HQ is quoted as saying "We knew that in two years' time, that is by the end of 1942, beginning of 1943, the English would be ready, the Americans would be ready, the Russians would be ready too, and then we would have to deal with all three of them at the same time.... We had to try to remove the greatest threat from the East."

They therefore chose to attack the Soviets in the hope of defeating them in a quick offensive and then be able to turn their attention to Britain before they were fully prepared themselves in 1943. There need for oil proved problematic here though as instead of focusing fully on taking Moscow before winter, they instead focused on taking the oil fields in southern Russia and the Ukraine. The offensive on Moscow was delayed, Winter set in and the rest as they say is History.

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In the early part of the war the US lacked the right ships and skills to protect convoys off their eastern shore - so some armed British naval reserve, mainly converted merchantmen were sent to help them (and us out).

 

Up until mid 1942 the Americans didn't use convoys for their own coastal shipping, despite allocating fleet destroyers to assist UK bound convoys from Canada, ( which in fact they had been doing for many months previously whilst being ostensibly 'neutral' ). They didn't even blackout the coastline which helped the U-Boats to navigate, and to silhouette shipping against the lights.

 

It should be remembered that in took quite a few months, and some heavy loses for us to institute the convoy system ourselves, despite the lessons of WW1.

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Britain was the only country that was fighting for the complete duration of the war.

 

Depends on your perspective. I'm sure the Japanese would disagree - they entered Manchuria in 1931 and were at war for the next 14 years.

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There is also the fact that Stalin was carrying out large scale military reforms which would of come into place by 1942 which would have greatly strengthened their army. Hubert Menzel who was a major at the German army HQ is quoted as saying "We knew that in two years' time, that is by the end of 1942, beginning of 1943, the English would be ready, the Americans would be ready, the Russians would be ready too, and then we would have to deal with all three of them at the same time.... We had to try to remove the greatest threat from the East."

They therefore chose to attack the Soviets in the hope of defeating them in a quick offensive and then be able to turn their attention to Britain before they were fully prepared themselves in 1943. There need for oil proved problematic here though as instead of focusing fully on taking Moscow before winter, they instead focused on taking the oil fields in southern Russia and the Ukraine. The offensive on Moscow was delayed, Winter set in and the rest as they say is History.

 

There is a point of view that the Germans' plan to launch Barbarossa in May was actually a pre-emptive strike against a planned Soviet invasion due to start in August 1941, and that the reason so much Russian military materiel was ensnared in the first few weeks of hostilities was due to it's having been positioned in preparation for such a move.

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There is a point of view that the Germans' plan to launch Barbarossa in May was actually a pre-emptive strike against a planned Soviet invasion due to start in August 1941, and that the reason so much Russian military materiel was ensnared in the first few weeks of hostilities was due to it's having been positioned in preparation for such a move.

 

Yeah, I have heard that myself, wasn't it the Japs who intercepted Russian messages about it? Although If a Russian attack was imminent I do find it strange how static and unawares they were found on the first couple of days of the German attack.

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There is a point of view that the Germans' plan to launch Barbarossa in May was actually a pre-emptive strike against a planned Soviet invasion due to start in August 1941, and that the reason so much Russian military materiel was ensnared in the first few weeks of hostilities was due to it's having been positioned in preparation for such a move.

 

Never heard that before , what source is that from?

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